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DOES EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAPTURE WAR ON 
TERROR ACTIVITY? ON WHOSE EVIDENCE? 
Elspeth Guild* 
 
Abstract 
On 12 September 2012, the European Court of Human Rights handed down judgment in a complicated 
case regarding the freezing of assets and travel ban on a dual Italian Egyptian national resident in an 
Italian enclave surrounded by Switzerland. The human right on which the case was decided was the 
man's claim to respect for his private and family life. The security claim was that he was engaged in 
terrorist activities (mainly unspecified) and that the freezing of his assets and ban on travel were neces-
sary to protect international security as determined by the UN Security Council. Many issues arise in the 
case, not least that of the entitlement to a remedy which was central to the Kadi case in the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. In this contribution I examine the role of legal expertise - what claims 
are made in the name of legal expertise and how does the Court of Human Rights understand those 
claims. In the examination of the claims regarding legal expertise, the meaning itself of legal expertise 
as a concept becomes contested and embedded in practices of security and confidentiality. To what 
extent does a claim to legal expertise require that expertise to be accessible to those outside of the 
specific group which created it? Can a claim to legal expertise be confidential and at the same time 
performative in the face of a human rights challenge? These are the core questions of this article which 
are answered through a close reading of the reasoning of the Human Rights Court. 
 
Keywords 
legal expertise, terrorism, freezing of assets, travel ban.   
 
 
1 The War on Terror and Legal Expertise in European Human 
Rights Law − Examining the European Court of Human Rights in 
Nada v Switzerland 
On 12 September 2012, the European Court of Human Rights handed down 
judgment in a complicated case regarding the freezing of assets and travel 
ban on a dual Italian Egyptian national resident in an Italian enclave surroun-
ded by Switzerland. The human right on which the case was decided was the 
man's claim to respect for his private and family life. The security claim was 
that he was engaged in terrorist activities (mainly unspecified) and that the 
freezing of his assets and ban on travel were necessary to protect international 
security as determined by the UN Security Council. Many issues arise in the ca-
se, not least that of the entitlement to a remedy which was central to the Kadi 
case in the Court of Justice of the European Union. In this contribution I examine 
the role of legal expertise - what claims are made in the name of legal exper-
                                         
*  Jean Monnet Professor ad personam, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. 
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tise and how does the Court of Human Rights understand those claims. In the 
examination of the claims regarding legal expertise, the meaning itself of le-
gal expertise as a concept becomes contested and embedded in practices of 
security and confidentiality. To what extent does a claim to legal expertise 
require that expertise to be accessible to those outside of the specific group 
which created it? Can a claim to legal expertise be confidential and at the sa-
me time performative in the face of a human rights challenge? These are the 
core questions of this article which are answered through a close reading of the 
reasoning of the Human Rights Court. 
 
2. On law, knowledge and expertise 
Knowledge and the power to define knowledge are core components of law. 
The force of law comes from these two sources when coupled with enforcement 
mechanisms. Law in its active form, as performed in the court room and in legal 
procedures provides a mechanism by which claims to knowledge which reveal 
truth and pitted against one another. The parties to any legal proceeding ma-
ke claims to knowledge about what ‘actually’ happened in any specific instance 
in the past and produce information, witnesses etc in support of their claim to 
that knowledge. These claims are founded on attributions of expertise of some 
sort – in the most mundane form, to expertise simply because the witness was 
present and watching at the time an event occurred and by this happenstance 
has expertise in the form of present knowledge embedded in personal memory 
of what happened. In more sophisticated ways the expertise which may be 
performed in a legal action may include persons claiming special knowledge 
on the basis of diplomas or practical experience which give them sustainable 
claim to more knowledge than others. The legal procedure is designed to privi-
lege some claims to expertise over others. Judges and juries will be persuaded 
of the superior expertise of some witnesses over others in the process of deter-
mining the case before them. Guilt or acquittal in a criminal case, victory or 
defeat in a civil or administrative case depends on how the judges and juries 
allocate credibility to the claims to expertise of all kinds. Whether it is a case 
of witnesses to an event or highly qualified university professors whose written 
reports on a specific aspect of knowledge are presented to the court, the judge 
and jury will decide what weight to give to that expertise and where in the 
hierarchy of decision making it will be slotted.  
In this consideration of expertise, at some levels, the concept of expertise be-
comes synonymous with evidence. Evidence is a form of expertise for the pur-
poses of judicial proceedings. However, I will focus on expertise which is based 
on specific knowledge claims about a field of knowledge – international securi-
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2014/09 
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ty – rather than knowledge claims about individual events. In particular, I am 
interested here in how claims to international security expertise both explicit 
and implicit fare before a supra-national court charged with considering claims 
of human rights violations. Claims to specific expertise in the field of security 
are characterised by claims to confidentiality and secrecy1.  The exigencies of 
the protection of national and international security are frequently the reasons 
provided by security experts as the reason why they cannot make available 
the information on the basis of which their assessment of security needs are ba-
sed. Their expertise cannot be tested in the normal way through an examinati-
on of the information on the basis of which it was formed. Instead, the expertise 
rests on the authority of the expert making the claim.2  The more serious the 
expert’s claim to national or international security imperatives, the greater the 
sensitivity of the information on which it is based. How are these claims to ex-
pertise which can only be probed at the most superficial levels dealt with by a 
supranational human rights court? This is the central question of this article. 
The clash between history and law provide an excellent example regarding 
the capacity to privilege knowledge.3  While historians claim a specific mono-
poly over knowledge of the past based on their social science methodologies, 
legal systems constitute a different methodology to determine the past which 
permits not only a determination of what happened in the past but is also final 
and unassailable results in the form of concrete consequences for individuals 
(eg prison sentences). When the court of final instance speaks, the state’s coer-
cive organs carry out the sentence. It is because of this finality surrounding the 
decision of the court on what happened, that miscarriages of justice, when re-
vealed have such impact. When historians take on the judges and legal systems 
they need to be very determined as the capacity to capture ‘truth’ is highly 
institutionalised structures and to defended their truths against criticism.  
What is this knowledge which expertise creates? How is it constructed and who 
captures it? In this article I am going to examine only one judgment regarding 
a Mr Nada, a dual Italian and Egyptian citizen – from the European Court of 
Human Rights of 12 September 2012. This was a particularly momentous day 
in the annals of terrorism not only as it was 10 years and a day after the at-
tacks in the USA, but also because it was the same day that a US ambassador 
                                         
1  David Cole, Enemy aliens: Double standards and constitutional freedoms in the war on terrorism, New York: The New 
Press 2003; Barbara Olshansky, Secret trials and executions: military tribunals and the threat to democracy, Open 
Media Series, Vol. 7, New York: Seven Stories Press 2003. 
2  David D. Cole, ‘Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis’, Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 101, No. 8, August 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=519442. 
3  Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and certainty in seventeenth-century England: A study of the relationships between 
natural science, religion, history, law, and literature, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1983. 
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was killed in Libya in what appears to have been a terrorist attack, a victim of 
the continuing aftermath of the 11 September 2001 events.4  The judgment is 
about the legitimacy of the expertise on the basis of which a man’s name was 
put on the UN Sanctions list against the Taliban as a result of which all his as-
sets were frozen and he was effectively blocked in a tiny Italian enclave sur-
rounded by Switzerland for 13 years by the time the matter came before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).5  The struggle is a rather Titan one. 
On the one hand, the UN Sanctions Committee (the composition of which is ef-
fectively the same as the Security Council) relying on its privileged knowledge 
of who is a Taliban, who is a terrorist threat associated with the Taliban, claims 
a monopoly over knowledge about threat and risk from this (and other) sour-
ces. This knowledge is based on privileged information, the revelation of which 
might endanger people all over the world. This monopoly is upheld by the sta-
te authorities of all the UN member states who implement through their national 
law the sanctions called for by the UN Committee. It is a very specific form of 
expertise which permits these claims to knowledge to succeed. On the other 
side is the ECtHR a supranational, regional human rights court which claims the 
authority of any court to determine the content of facts, truth and life itself. Its 
right to determine the validity of expertise, even in the form of national and 
international security expertise, is that which is inherent in its duty to determine 
whether a human rights violation has occurred or not. In order to carry out this 
obligation, the ECtHR may be required, as in this case, to assess, explicitly or 
implicitly the weight of the expertise presented and to privilege some claims 
over others. Following the ECtHR are all the national courts of the Council of 
Europe states, obliged by the European Convention on Human Rights and nati-
onal law to implement correctly and in accordance with the ECtHR’s judgments 
the truth and facts as determined by it.  
Two supranational systems enter into direct competition regarding the entitle-
ment to determine what expertise is and how it is created in respect of a speci-
fic individual – Mr Nada. The first is the UN Sanctions Committee which on the 
basis of expertise brought to its attention determined that Mr Nada was such a 
threat to international security that a very fundamental interference with his life 
was justified – the freezing of all his assets and a travel ban.6  The second is 
                                         
4  ‘Chris Stevens, US ambassador to Libya, killed in Benghazi attack’, Guardian newspaper, 12 September 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/12/chris-stevens-us-ambassador-libya-killed, visited 31 October 
2012. 
5  Nada v Switzerland European Court of Human Rights, 12 September 2012 (not yet reported). 
6  Marieke De Goede, ‘The politics of preemption and the war on terror in Europe’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 14.1 (2008), p. 161-185; Elspeth Guild, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Counter‐Terrorism Policies in Europe: 
→ 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2014/09 
 
 
7 
 
the ECtHR a regional supranational human rights court. As discussed below, four 
countries claimed the expertise to determine the existence or otherwise of a 
national and international security threat which Mr Nada posed. Both suprana-
tional systems are founded on claims of legality – the Sanctions List is a UN 
Resolution adopted by the UN Security Council and transposed into the natio-
nal laws of the UN member states. The list of people whose assets must be fro-
zen and who must not be permitted to move about freely is a creation of one 
type of law.7  The entitlement of the ECtHR to determine the facts and law is 
based on another supranational system of law, human rights law (the European 
Convention on Human Rights) which gives it the entitlement to determine accor-
ding to its rules what knowledge is about threat and risk.8  While this story is 
not so unusual , one might even call it banal and the daily stuff of authorities 
and courts – authorities make laws, courts interpret them not always in the way 
the authorities envisaged – the extraordinary feature of this conflict about the 
entitlement to determine the quality of expertise is the fact that it takes place 
in the territory of national and international security. This field of global threat 
and security imperative has been staked out by the experts of security as their 
monopoly.9  The right to decide expertise on threat and risk has been claimed 
by them in such a comprehensive manner that challenge by any authority exte-
rior to the experts (including by the courts) is excluded by law both national 
and supranational.10  Even the principle of transparency and the right to know 
the content of the allegations against the person subject to the measures are 
suspended. There is no right to a criminal trial against the allegations even 
though the penalties for being under suspicion are in most ways more severe 
than those which apply to convicted criminals. This claim to knowledge experti-
se is not of the garden variety. It is ring-fenced against challenge in the most 
complete manner possible.11 Thus the struggle of the titans which takes place in 
this judgment is particularly interesting to an understanding of the nature and 
power of legal expertise and its capacity to challenge and be challenged. 
                                         
The Case of the ‘Terrorist Lists’’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46.1 (2008), p. 173-193; Peter Guthe-
rie, ‘Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights’, NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L., 60 (2004), p. 491. 
7  Andrea Bianchi, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s anti-terrorism measures: the quest for 
legitimacy and cohesion’, European Journal of International Law 17.5 (2006), p. 881-919. 
8  David Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford Oxford University Press 2009. 
9  Anna Leander, ‘The power to construct international security: on the significance of private military companies’, 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33.3 (2005), p. 803-825. 
10  Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘‘It Sounds Like a Riddle’: Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk’, Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 33.2 (2004), p. 381-395. 
11  Didier Bigo, Terror, insecurity and liberty: illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11, Routledge studies in liberty 
and security, Vol. 1, London/New York: Routledge, 2008. 
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3. Nada v Switzerland 12 September 2012 European Court of 
Human Rights 
The facts 
Mr Nada was born in 1931 and has been living since 1970 in Campione 
d’Italia, which is an Italian enclave of about 1.6 sq. km in the Province of Como 
(Lombardy), surrounded by the Swiss Canton of Ticino and separated from the 
rest of Italy by Lake Lugano. According to the ECtHR, he described himself as a 
practising Muslim and a prominent businessman in the financial and political 
world, in which he purported to be highly regarded. An engineer by training, 
he worked in very diverse sectors, in particular banking, foreign trade, industry 
and real estate. In the course of his business activities he founded numerous 
companies of which he was the sole or principal shareholder. He has a number 
of medical conditions requiring hospital treatment. 
On 15 October 1999 Security Council Resolution 1267 was adopted providing 
for sanctions against the Taliban (in the wake of the bombing of the US embas-
sy in Dar-es-Salaam). This was implemented by the Swiss authorities. The Sanc-
tions list was extended in 2000 to include friends of Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda. The Swiss authorities implemented this too. On 7 November 2001 the 
US President blocked the assets of Bank Al Taqwa of which Mr Nada was 
chairman and principal shareholder. Two days later, Mr Nada’s name was ad-
ded to the Sanctions list which requires all UN states to freeze the assets and 
prevent free movement of people on it. In the meantime a Swiss prosecutor 
commenced an inquiry into Mr Nada. Security Council Resolution 1390, adop-
ted on 16 January 2002 introduced entry and transit bans for people on the 
Sanctions list. When Mr Nada visited London in November 2002 he was arre-
sted and removed to Italy. All his money was seized.  
It seems that the Swiss (and Italian) authorities were not terrible quick off the 
mark in subjecting Mr Nada to sanctions. Apparently, this kind of failing was 
sufficiently important that a Monitoring Group was established under Security 
Council Resolution 1363 in 2001 comprised on five experts (selected on the 
basis of equitable geographical distribution apparently) to monitor states and 
make sure they carry out their listing obligations. This Group criticised the Swiss 
implementation of the Sanctions list and bans. As a result the Swiss Canton of 
Ticino revoked Mr Nada’s border-crossing permit, after which time he was ef-
fective a prisoner in the Italian enclave. On 31 May 2005, the Swiss prosecutor 
closed his investigation into Mr Nada, finding that the accusations against him 
were unsubstantiated. 
Mr Nada began various legal proceedings in Switzerland to have his name 
deleted from the national implementing measure of the Sanctions list. This fai-
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2014/09 
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led as the Swiss authorities and courts considered that as they were only carry-
ing out a UN Security Council Resolution, the remedy had to come from that 
source and not from the Swiss authorities.12  Mr Nada applied to the Sanctions 
Committee to have his name removed which application was rejected without 
reasons and with an express refusal to provide information regarding which 
state had proposed his listing and on what grounds.13  
Eventually, and with the intervention of both the Italian and Swiss authorities, 
Mr Nada’s name was finally removed from the list in 2009.  
A Human Rights Issue? 
Mr Nada claimed that the actions of the Swiss authorities rendering him a 
prisoner in his little enclave (where there were inadequate medical facilities for 
his medical conditions) breached the following human rights: 
• His right to liberty guaranteed under Article 5 ECHR; 
• His right to respect for his private and family life, honour and reputation 
guaranteed by Article 8; 
• His treatment was tantamount to ill-treatment contrary to the prohibition 
in Article 3 of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
• His right to manifest his religion and beliefs (as he could no longer go to 
the mosque to pray as this was outside his enclave) guaranteed by Arti-
cle 9; 
• His right to an effective remedy in circumstances where a substantive 
right has been breached as there was no court or tribunal to which he 
could take his case and get a remedy contrary to his right to an effecti-
ve remedy in Article 13. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that only the claims of a breach of 
Article 8 (the right to respect for family and private life) and Article 13 (the 
right to an effective remedy) were admissible. It found that Switzerland is res-
ponsible for a breach of both articles in respect of Mr Nada. It awarded Mr 
Nada €30,000 in damages for the breach.  
There has been some legal analysis of the case since the decision. Milanovic14  
considered that the ECtHR chose to determine the case on relatively narrow 
grounds of the right to private life not least to assist in avoiding a decision on 
                                         
12  Clemens A. Feinäugle, The UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee: Emerging Principles of 
International Institutional Law for the Protection of Individuals?, The Exercise of Public Authority by International Insti-
tutions 2010, p. 101-131. 
13  Jorge Godinho, ‘When worlds collide: Enforcing United Nations Security Council asset freezes in the EU legal or-
der’, European Law Journal 16.1 (2009), p. 67-93. 
14  Marko Milanovic, ‘European Court decides Nada v Switzerland’, EJIL Talk!, 14 September 2012. 
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the question of supremacy under the UN Charter (Article 103). The conflict of 
norms between the ECtHR and the UN Security council was avoided, in his opi-
nion because the ECtHR held that the measures taken by the Swiss authorities 
were not proportionate and the Swiss could have done more to alleviate Mr 
Nada’s situation within the scope of the Security Council resolution. Henderson15  
highlights the fact that the ECtHR insisted on the limited but nevertheless real 
latitude which the Swiss authorities had in how to implement the UNSC resoluti-
on. He notes that some of the judges in a concurring opinion to the judgment 
express concern about this finding as possibly unrealistic. He considers that the 
ECtHR followed the EU’s court, the Court of Justice of the European Union in its 
judgment in Kadi16 in effectively finding that there are two different systems of 
law and that international law did not prevent the court from reviewing some-
thing done by a state or institutions in order to comply with an international law 
obligation. The result, according to him is that while a state must obey the UN 
even when risking a breach of a human right but must always allow the indivi-
dual an effective remedy (a fairly controversial assessment of the decision). 
Thienel17 takes a somewhat different approach. He examines the options which 
were open to the ECtHR and it choice to find a breach of the right to respect 
for private and family life of Mr Nada. Switzerland ought to have alerted Ita-
ly, as the country of nationality and residence of Mr Nada that there was no 
reasonable suspicion against him and to adapt the sanctions to his particular 
situation. So far the commentary on the case has not focused on the issue of 
expertise – which experts are to be believed and on the basis of what know-
ledge? 
4. Why was Mr Nada on the Sanctions Committee’s List? 
Turning then to the judgment and its use of information – what claims are made 
for finding that Mr Nada was a security risk? The central issue for Mr Nada is 
the expertise used to justify his inclusion on the Sanctions list. His listing occurred 
on 9 November 2001. The allegation in the Sanctions list created by UN Reso-
lution 1267 (1999) was that those on the list were associates or members of al-
Qaeda or the Taliban. The ECtHR cites the conclusions of the Swiss national 
court which had to grapple with the issue before it went to Strasbourg, which is 
                                         
15  Alasdair Henderson, ‘When the UN breach human rights... who wins?’, UK Human Rights Blog, 5 October 2012. 
16  Katja S. Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, But Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ 
from the Perspective of Human Rights (April 2009)’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2009; Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 11/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358376/. 
17  Tobias Thienel, ‘Nada v Switzerland: the ECtHR Does not Pull a Kadi (But Mandates It for Domestic Law)’, Invisible 
College Blog, 12 September 2012. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2014/09 
 
 
11 
 
rather unsatisfactory as it refers to an event which post-dates the listing by 
seven years. When pressed by a national court in Switzerland, the Swiss autho-
rities informed the court that Mr Nada had, in April 2008, been convicted (in 
absentia) by a Military Tribunal in Egypt to ten years imprisonment for provi-
ding financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood. When pressed by the ECtHR 
in chamber, the Swiss authorities stated that Mr Nada had been listed by the 
USA, but by the time this information was provided, in the summer of 2009, the 
USA had requested the de-listing of Mr Nada (this took place on 23 Septem-
ber 2009). The political choice of the Swiss authorities in the first instance, be-
fore their own courts was to claim expertise of the same kind and nature as the 
knowledge about to be turned into expertise by the Swiss court – a judgment 
of a court itself. Albeit an Egyptian Military Tribunal, nonetheless, the intention 
is to claim legitimacy for the expertise on the basis of the decision of another 
judicial instance. In the second step, when the ECtHR itself in chamber pressed 
the Swiss authorities about the listing, they chose no longer to rely on the judg-
ment of the Egyptian court but rather to refer to another country, the USA, as 
the source of expertise. Beyond the generic indication of a country no further 
expertise is produced. The implication is that interstate solidarity and trust is 
the source of the legitimacy of the expertise on the basis of which Mr Nada’s 
life was made exceedingly uncomfortable. The US claimed expertise in submit-
ting Mr Nada’s name for inclusion on the sanctions list. The Swiss authorities ac-
cepted that expertise because the US authorities had put it forward and it had 
been accepted by the Sanctions Committee. There is no suggestions that the 
Swiss authorities considered that they had an entitlement to know anything 
further about that expertise.  
In all the court proceedings, in Switzerland, Italy and before the ECtHR, the 
nature of the expertise on the basis of which Mr Nada had been listed in the 
first place was never revealed. This expertise was never even alluded to in the 
ECtHR judgment. The implicit expertise of the Sanctions list was that if a state 
proposed an individual for the list then the expertise on which the state had 
done so was valid and beyond question. The confidential nature of the experti-
se on the basis of which people are included on the Sanctions list was not chal-
lenged by the ECtHR. It did not insist that the background information on the 
basis of which the claim to expertise was based be revealed. Instead, it accep-
ted that the act of putting Mr Nada on the list had been carried out in accor-
dance with the SC Resolution.  
5. What was the role of knowledge claims in the case? 
It is clear from the facts that the knowledge claims of at least four countries 
were at stake: 
Guild: Does European Human Rights Law Capture War on Terror Activity?  
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• Switzerland – its counter terrorism authorities (about which the judgment 
is silent) and its criminal justice authorities; 
• Italy – its counter terrorism authorities (about which the judgment is si-
lent) and its criminal justice authorities; 
• Egypt – the Egyptian military criminal justice authorities hand down a 
judgment in absentia (about which proceedings Mr Nada claimed he 
had no idea) against Mr Nada for financial support of the Muslim Bro-
therhood and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment;  
• The USA – this state actor only appears very late in the affair when in 
2009 the Swiss authorities state that Mr Nada was listed at the request 
of that country. 
 
The human rights breaches which the ECtHR found in this case revolved around 
the assessment by the Swiss authorities that the action of containing Mr Nada in 
an enclave in Italy was necessary in a democratic society. In order to satisfy 
that test, the action must answer a pressing social need and be proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued. The reasons given by the national authorities to 
justify the measures must be relevant and sufficient. In order to fulfil this test, 
there must be an assessment by the authorities that the possible recourse to an 
alternative measure that would cause less damage to the fundamental right at 
issue whilst fulfilling the same aim must be ruled out. The final evaluation of 
whether the interference is necessary remains a matter for the ECtHR to review 
on the basis of the evidence placed before it. Thus the question of who is entit-
led to decide what is expertise in the field of assessment of terrorism threats on 
the basis of which actions may be justified or not, rests not with the national 
authorities at the end of the day but with the supranational court. It is for the 
national authorities to show that their expertise was relevant and sufficient. In 
this assessment, the ECtHR stated that it was prepared to take into account the 
fact that the threat of terrorism was particularly serious at the time when the 
Sanctions regime was adopted (1999-2002). The proof of that state of heigh-
tened terrorist threat is given as ‘the wording of the resolutions and the context 
in which they were adopted’. There is no apparent expertise beyond the words 
and context (which is never spelt out).  
Of particular importance for the ECtHR is the fact that the investigations by the 
criminal justice authorities in Italy and Switzerland concluded that the suspicions 
about Mr Nada’s participation in activities related to international terrorism 
were unfounded. Thus the ECtHR privileges the expertise of the criminal justice 
authorities of two Council of Europe member States over the UN Sanctions Re-
solution as regards the assessment of the necessity of the measures. The Court 
highlighted the fact that the Swiss Federal Prosecutor closed its investigation on 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2014/09 
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31 May 2005 and on 5 July 2008 the Italian Government submitted to the 
Sanctions Committee a request for Mr Nada to be de-listed on the grounds that 
the proceedings against him in Italy had been discontinued.  
The ECtHR claimed a monopoly in the final instance of determining what exper-
tise is, implicitly if not explicitly. By claiming the right to determine whether Mr 
Nada’s human rights had been violated, the Court was entitled to examine all 
the expertise on the basis of which that violation has taken place. That experti-
se which is not made available to the Court is not taken into account. Elsewhere 
the Court will have to determine the validity of judicial proceedings where the 
expertise is placed before a court but in closed proceedings where the indivi-
dual whether plaintiff or defendant) is not allow to know its contents or to see 
it. This was not the issue in this case, as the ultimate expertise as to why Mr Na-
da was considered a security risk was never divulged. 
The criminal justice authorities of Switzerland appear to be the first to undermi-
ne the accuracy of the information of the Sanctions list by their finding in 2005 
that the suspicions against Mr Nada were unfounded. Their counterparts in Italy 
followed suit. At this point, it would seem that there was a re-assessment of the 
quality of the expertise by the Swiss authorities as gradually, with the assistan-
ce of a variety of Swiss courts, including its Federal Court, the expertise of the 
criminal justice authorities gained strength against that of the Sanctions list. The 
result was that the Swiss authorities were eventually convinced, with the assis-
tance of their courts, to request the Sanctions Committee to de-list Mr Nada. 
This request took place on 2 September 2009.  
The Italian authorities seemed to have resolved their issues about expertise on 
Mr Nada more slowly than their Swiss counterparts. This is slightly surprising as 
Mr Nada was, in any event, resident on their territory and their citizen. Howe-
ver, at the relevant time Italy was a member of the Security Council according 
to the ECtHR judgment. The Italian criminal justice authorities closed their inquiry 
into Mr Nada and requested his de-listing by the Sanctions Committee on 5 
July 2008 (this request was rejected by the committee on 15 July 2008 without 
reasons). 
As these events were unfolding, the bizarre case of the Egyptian military tribu-
nal’s conviction of Mr Nada occurred. He had been living in Italy since 1970 
and is a dual Italian/Egyptian national. He is a civilian and since taking up re-
sidence in Italy, at least, has never been part of the military in Egypt or else-
where as far as one can tell. In the ECtHR judgment, there is no information 
about the military tribunal’s proceedings against Mr Nada which took place in 
April 2008. Indeed, the exact date of the event is missing from the judgment. 
The capacity of constructing this court judgment as a source of knowledge 
about the threat which Mr Nada might be is thus flawed as we do not even 
know precisely when it happened. The only evidence of the trial that the ECtHR 
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referred to was an article in the Italian newspaper Corriere del Ticino, dated 
16 April 2008. The way in which the ECtHR constructs the narrative one is left 
with the suspicion that there is a nexus between the Italian Government’s re-
quest for de-listing of Mr Nada and the sudden interest of the Egyptian autho-
rities into Mr Nada’s financial affairs. Be that as it may, the expertise of the 
Egyptian military tribunal as a court which has reached a criminal conviction of 
Mr Nada plays no further role in the case. Although this is a criminal justice au-
thority in a fraternal relationship one might say with the Italian and Swiss crimi-
nal justice authorities (though different because the Egyptian one is military), 
the capacity to transform the judgment of the Egyptian military tribunal into 
persuasive expertise appears to be unsuccessful before the ECtHR. 
It is only as the narrative of the case unfolds that the shadow of information 
behind the other three countries activities gradually emerges – that of the USA. 
This information never takes a shape more substantial that the fact of the re-
quest for the Sanctions Committee listing of Mr Nada. As the requests for de-
listing of Mr Nada eventually made by the Italian authorities and their Swiss 
counterparts, never elicited a response with reasons of any kind, let alone a 
mechanism for challenge of the findings, they remain completely shielded from 
the judicial process. This nothwith¬stand¬ing, it is this expertise which appears 
to have driven the whole affair. 
6. What conclusions regarding knowledge? 
What an analysis of the ECtHR decision on Mr Nada reveals is the competition 
inherent in claims about expert knowledge. For expertise to enter into the poli-
tical or legal domain it needs champions capable of carrying their claims to 
knowledge and its construction. In order for that construction of expertise to be 
effective, its champions need to be able either to defend it if the expertise be-
comes public or ensure that it never becomes public. In competitions for mono-
polies over the reliability of expertise, the first tactic will be the most effective 
so long as the construction of information is sufficiently strong to support it. The 
second approach is more risky. In the war on terror, however, it has taken an 
important place in the arsenal of state responses. It depends, though, on its 
champions being able to protect themselves and their expertise from any in-
quiry by possibly sceptical third parties. In order to keep something secret, tho-
se trying to keep the secret must ensure that there is no review procedure by 
independent external actors which will require the secrets to be justified. When 
faced with such a challenge, the capacity to maintain action based on the se-
cret knowledge is undermined. The cost of keeping the secrets secret is that 
they lose their capacity to found action against specific individuals. The role of 
human rights law which can be adjudicated by a court set outside the immedia-
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te ring of separation of powers at the national level and, unlike national courts, 
not surrounded by other arms of government at the same supranational level, 
appears, at least in this case to have provided an interesting last word on ex-
pertise in the war on terror. 
 
 
 
